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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2453
______________________________________
SONYA ORMSBY,
Appellant
v.
LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE OFFICE OF HUMAN SERVICES;
LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH
SERVICES; EUGENE D. CAPRIO; DONNA VHREL;
RHONDA ALLEN; JACKIE FALCHECK
______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00568)
District Judge: James M. Munley
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
July 21, 2005
Before: ROTH, BARRY AND SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: September 12, 2005)
____________________
OPINION
_______________________

PER CURIAM
Appellant Sonya Ormsby, proceeding pro se, appeals the April 5, 2005, order of
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing her

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, we will
dismiss the appeal as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 315 (1989).
The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will only briefly revisit them here.
On March 22, 2002, Ormsby’s daughter was removed from her custody by the Luzerne
County Children and Youth Services (“LCCYS”) due to a report of child abuse or serious
neglect. Following a March 28, 2002, hearing in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne
County, the child was temporarily placed in the custody of her biological father, Reginald
Ormsby. On April 11, 2002, LCCYS completed its investigation into the report of abuse
and neglect, and concluded that it was unfounded. Approximately three weeks later, on
April 30, 2002, the Court of Common Pleas ordered that the child remain in the physical
custody of her father.
On March 22, 2005, Ormsby submitted the underlying complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 in the District Court. In her fifty-six page complaint,
Ormsby alleged various civil rights violations, as well as state law claims for negligent
supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all stemming from the March
and April 2002 LCCYS investigation and court proceedings. On April 5, 2005, the
District Court sua sponte dismissed Ormsby’s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B),
finding all of her claims barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. This timely appeal
followed.
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This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal for frivolousness. See Mitchell v.
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (2003). After a careful review of the record, we will dismiss
this appeal as frivolous.
As the District Court explained, claims brought pursuant to § 1983 or § 1985 are
subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years in
Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 266-267 (1985); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). Claims for
negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress brought in
Pennsylvania are also governed by this two year limitations period, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5524, while claims asserted under § 1986 are subject to a one year statute of
limitations. See Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dept., 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989).
A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. See Sameric Corp. of Delware, Inc. v.
City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). It is clear from Ormsby’s
complaint that she was aware of the alleged wrongdoing at the latest on May 1, 2002,
when she received notice that her daughter had been ordered to remain in Reginald
Ormsby’s custody. Because Ormsby did not submit her complaint until March 22, 2005,
beyond the relevant statutory periods, her complaint was properly dismissed as timebarred.
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Ormsby attempts to avoid this outcome by arguing that the statute of limitations
should be tolled: (1) under Pennsylvania’s discovery rule until September 2003, when she
obtained all of the facts surrounding her claims and “realized” that the defendants had
“violat[ed] . . . her constitutional and civil rights;” or (2) under equitable tolling
principles. We can reject Ormsby’s tolling arguments with little difficulty.
Pennsylvania law recognizes that “‘in some circumstances, although the right to
institute suit may arise, a party may not, despite the exercise of due diligence, reasonably
discover that he has been injured.’” Haugh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 227, 231 (3d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000)). In such
cases, the discovery rule will serve to toll “the running of the applicable statute of
limitations until the complaining party knows or reasonably should know that [s]he has
been injured and that [her] injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.” Crouse,
745 A.2d at 611. Ormsby can derive no benefit from this rule, however, as she was
certainly on notice of the alleged injuries she suffered due to the defendants’ actions at
the conclusion of the 2002 neglect and dependency hearings and child custody
proceedings.
Likewise, it is clear from the face of Ormsby’s complaint that there is no basis for
the application of equitable tolling principles. “Equitable tolling functions to stop the
statute of limitations from running where the claim’s accrual date has already passed.”
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Generally equitable tolling may be appropriate where: (1) a defendant actively misleads a
plaintiff regarding her cause of action; (2) a plaintiff has been prevented from asserting a
claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) a plaintiff has timely
asserted her claims, but in the wrong forum. See Lake, 232 F.3d at 370 n. 9. None of
these situations is presented here, and Ormsby has offered no other justification for tolling
the statutes of limitation.
In conclusion, neither the discovery rule nor the doctrine of equitable tolling
provides grounds for tolling the statute of limitations in this case. As such, Ormsby’s
complaint is time-barred. Therefore, having found no merit to this appeal, we will
dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

